A Philosophical Perspective on Intuition as a Method within Artistic Process

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Abstract

Intuition is commonly understood as knowledge acquired directly, immediately, self-referentially, non-conceptually, without the intercession of the intellect, unmediated by academic or scientific methodologies, or formal, disciplined, logical discourse. In this paper we examine how intuition works within creative process, particularly artistic, by way of Henri Bergson's initial theorisation of intuition in Creative Evolution (L’Évolution créatrice, 1907, trans. 1944) and A Study in Metaphysics: The Creative Mind (La Pensée et le mouvant, 1934, trans. 1970) and its subsequent elaboration by Gilles Deleuze in Bergsonism (Le Bergsonisme, 1966, trans. 1991). We explicate how intuition as a method results from a progressive reduction of the separation between the virtual and the actual as the convergent movement of thought which brings together the ideal and the material as pure process within artistic practices. We posit intuition in terms of appropriate problematising, differentiating and temporalising within the creative procession into novelty and the advancement of invention. We consider the immediacy of intuitive knowledge as the adequation of the positing of the problem and its fitting solution as well as the pedagogical aspects of intuition which emerge immanently actualised through the reproduction and transmittal of knowledge.

Keywords: intuition, art, problem, method, creation.

Introduction

In Bergsonism, Deleuze claims that intuition as a method is one of the most fully developed methods in philosophy (Deleuze, 1991, p. 13). Yet, many still see intuition as an irrational, mysterious faculty. Mario Bunge, the Argentinian/Canadian philosopher of science, goes so far as to write in his book Intuition et raison (2001) that, in contrast to mathematical and scientific intuition, philosophical intuition winds up becoming a philosophy concocted by perverts for the irrational.¹ There is obviously a wide gap between the two camps and we seek to reconcile and align various understandings of intuition under Bergson’s ideation and Deleuze’s expression of intuition as method.

The first meaning that comes to mind when discussing intuition is the spontaneous understanding of a situation or problem as a hunch or gut feeling—an innate intelligence or instinct that unconsciously and directly produces insights. From the standpoint of common sense, intuition is seen as the immediate apprehension of an object by the mind without the intervention of reasoning and where “an intuition” is the particular result of such apprehension as an occurrence of mind. Thus, intuition is commonly understood as knowledge acquired directly, immediately, self-referentially, non-conceptually, without the intercession of the intellect, unmediated by academic or scientific methodologies, or formal, disciplined, logical discourse. If intuition as an epistemic method that somehow directly articulates sensory perception, then knowledge thus acquired is deemed to have no lasting value or academic validity—if anything, because the immediacy of unmediated intuitions is a direct derivation from subjective inner experience impossible to discipline. Even if the spontaneous insights of intuition bypass systematic methods of knowledge production, intuition’s direct access to the production of understanding constitutes a method. There should be a

¹ “L’intuitionnisme philosophique finit donc par devenir une philosophie faite par des pervers pour des irrationnels” (Bunge, 2001, 32).
coherence in the operational functioning of intuition whether our considerations are concerned with events at a molecular or molar scale, or within modes of iterative artistic production or in the research-creation activity of artistic practice.

We wish to examine what intuition can mean within creative processes, particularly artistic, by way of Henri Bergson’s initial theorisation of intuition in Creative Evolution (L’Évolution créatrice, 1907, trans. 1944) and A Study in Metaphysics: The Creative Mind (La Pensée et le mouvant, 1934, trans. 1970) and subsequently elaborated by Gilles Deleuze in Bergsonism (Le Bergsonisme, 1966, trans. 1991). Specifically, we trace how intuition as a method results from a progressive reduction of the separation between the virtual and the actual as the convergent movement of thought which brings together the ideal and the material in artistic practices as pure process. We consider the immediacy of intuitive knowledge as the adequation of the positing of the problem and its fitting solution as well as the pedagogical aspects of intuition which emerge immanently actualised through the reproduction and transmittal of knowledge. As such, based on this approach as articulated by Bergson and Deleuze, we propose specifically to examine how intuition arises within iterative artistic and studio practices and follow through with a theoretical consideration of the movement produced by and within intuition.

This article is not a survey of philosophical thought relative to intuition and does not pretend to compare schools of thought on the topic nor its applications in various domains. Neither is it a step-by-step instruction manual towards the instilling of a protocol for integrating intuition as a method within artistic practices. Some readers might discern a common line of thought with the ideas of Benedetto Croce on intuition in art but despite the similar concerns expressed in Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic (L’Estetica come scienza dell’espressione e linguistica generale (1902, trans. 2005)) there are important differences. Each aspect of intuition that Croce raises is examined within Bergson’s and Deleuze’s exposition yet in a decidedly different light. The principal distinction originates in the ontological underpinnings: Bergson and Deleuze conceive thought as processual, Croce does not. Whether it is the nature of intuitive knowledge itself, its independence in respect to the intellect and the conceptual, or its understanding of perception as knowledge of actual reality, they all point towards an irreconcilable rift between the two camps—the French philosophers think ‘heterogeneously’ with and through the encounter with nature, the Italian philosopher thinks ‘homogeneously’ about the world. Where Croce asserts “to have intuitions is to place in space and in temporal sequence” (Croce, 2005, p. 4), Bergson (1965, p. 129) and Deleuze (1991, p. 35) contend that intuition presupposes duration and immanence: rather than reveal character, intuition reveals movement and change, perpetual becoming. Croce considers intuition to be representation and, more critically, expression. Deleuze rejects representation and finds the expression of intuition in the imagistic of the active contraction as productive of difference.

Throughout the text, we render explicit the properties traditionally attributed to the formulation of the idea of intuition but articulated in dynamic processual terms. As a result the language sometimes takes on unusual turns in order to try to convey the agency of incessant change and movement necessary to the philosophy of difference. Our position is not grounded on the inferential determination of knowledge from uncaused causes but on the progressive conditioning of the event as a convergent processual and progressive limitation which ineluctably yields the desired result as immanent emergence. It is a mode of thought that is not anchored on conceptual definition and does not rely on symbols for transmission, but is clearly productive of knowledge all the same. We use the term method not as as a special procedure for attaining a result but as the reason a process acquires in its advance. The procession of advance is the method, where method—from the Greek μεταχοδος (metahodos), meta- “after” and -hodos “a traveling, way”—constitutes knowledge as simultaneously spatially unfolded and performatively revealed. The transition within advance is the mode or modification which the causal agency and logical impulsion of method bring to bear. As such, the method does not exist a priori to the process of creation, since it is constituted in the process itself and is only apprehended as a difference discerned a posteriori.
Intuitive Revelation within Iterative Practices

Intuition has all to do with the production of difference, the creative procession into novelty and the happening-upon of invention even if innovation as transformative advancement of a solution to a problem is what is decisive. The difference here between innovation and invention as two modes of creative movement is what amounts to an uncaused causality that produces a chance discovery whether as part of a systematic approach of innovation or as a fortuitous stumbling upon as discovery. Invention and innovation as such can arise in the oddest of creative environments or within the least likely of activities. Any practice which entails intensive iteration and unremitting repetition of the same gestures, deeds, movements or activities can be deemed a tabula rasa from which creativity and innovation can emerge. The iterative gesture as sameness is the featureless ground from which any deviation makes its appearance felt in the instant. Once a deviation is seen, felt, heard, tasted, smelled or affectively felt as difference, there is ground for divergence. The wayward deviation is an affective impulse which is inadequate in terms of a perception yet becomes recognised as either contributive or detractive from the endeavour at hand. In Spinozist terms, it increases or decreases the capacity of everything and everyone involved to affect or to be affected. Seen as creative variation, as incipient innovative possibility, the wayward gesture as producer of affect indicates a possible direction for further research which, when recognised as such, can be considered an instance of intuitive individuation as inventive direction.

A production potter who can throw 100 “identical” bowls in one day, prepares 100 “identical” balls of clay prior to sitting at the wheel. Once she begins, she listens to the radio while working, without having to pay attention to the throwing-doing which is for her a thoughtless routine that becomes automatic gesture as she has already thrown bowls like this thousands of times. But while throwing bowl number 73, her forefinger snags ever so slightly on a patch of clay that normally would be slick with slip; her attention is pulled away from the radio program to the forefinger; she again feels the tug on her finger and, rather than wet it, her years of work at the wheel unconsciously tell her that she does not have to; caught between negating her instinct and risking ruining the piece, her reaction while pulling up on the clay is to slightly alter the angle of the second knuckle of the forefinger of her right hand to compensate for the resistance; she notices that the tiny gesture dramatically increases the speed with which the clay allows itself to be pulled and therefore how fast she can throw a bowl—the intuition pays off. The commitment to the “go with it” is the power of decision of a pre-subjective venture into the exercise of one’s creative freedom: it is true majority in that rather than fall back on the tried-and-true of the proven, of the given solution provided by the teacher which keeps her in nonage and dependence, the craftswoman ventures forth into the relative unknown of the recognition of the problematic situation through its conversion to the possibility of resolution as innovation. “It is here that humanity makes its own history” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 16) and comes into its own as a major, full-fledged adult craftswoman. In this sense, creation is seen not only as the capacity to solve a given problem, but rather as an opportunity to problematise further from the reality that affects us.

This type of intuition-based discovery is second-nature to artisans, artists and performers. It is found in any of the iteration-based practices which require the repetition of the same technique or movements in tune with instruments or tools, the rehearsal of gestures or coordinated interactions with other bodies. The main point here is that the discovery or innovation is not the result of directed, programmed, systematic, methodical, conscious experimentation with technique or method—it is a direct, non-conceptual, pre-scientific and pre-linguistic determination: the invention, the coming to discovery, is unmediated and unthought, but the result is clear, repeatable, and confirmable—it is a result of the going-with-it of practical insight into creative process: it is a solution to a problem we didn’t even know was there since it comes to us from the future and not formulated in the past. At this point, the intellect can be brought back into the picture to

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2 This adult/nonage discussion is carried further in Gilbert Simondon’s (1969) Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. It is an argument derived from Immanuel Kant’s 1784 renowned Aufklärung article, An Answer to the Question: “What is Enlightenment?”.

3 And in terms of the transmittal of this direct unmediated knowledge as a pedagogic strategy, when the auspicious conditions for the production of the intuition are reproduced.
systematise the acquisition of the result and design a round of experimentation as a scientific, practice-based innovation.

Any method that relies on iterative repetition of the same gestures as practice can be seen as a source of creative invention that confuses the lines of systematicity and accidental discovery. Intuition leads forth where method—literally, the way of doing things as the course of action—has become a mindless habit so that straying from the methodological path immediately reveals the difference in kind as a different manner to carry out a task or perform a gesture which arises as possibility in repetition as a panoply of indeterminate choices as to the ‘what can be done next’.4 The familiarity of the iterative-process-become-habit allows the detection of the wavering away from the known: it permits us to deviate from established precedent, from standard practice made perfect, from the chronic appeal to memory as the centereredness of the well-trod groove, from the ‘what has already been done’, to the unexplored novelty of the ‘what could be done next’. Yet, that familiarity breeds contempt for the possibility of innovation to arise and fosters disdain for the creative potential available in repetition; for intuition to work, the concentration of focus must lie in the doing at hand while being receptive to the conditioning of possibility as the immanence of opportunity that iteration offers—it is an attentment with the process that acknowledges the differential drift to take flight rather than follow the tendentious path of the same-ol’, same-ol’ tangent of the been-there-done-that. Once difference is discerned within the process of the regularity of perfected habit, of the known as a set memory circuit, intuition opens up the what-it-is-not of the process as the actualisation of potential as the becoming-possible of the now as differential, as a something else.

Intuition occurs in the immanent incipiency of a rift between ‘the could’ and the ‘might’, in the differentiation of the ‘now’ and the ‘has-been’, in the interval of difference and repetition. As the occupation of the negative, of that which the process is not, and the extension of that what is, an occupation as a doing is not a taking up of space through activity, but the activity of bringing iteration to a crisis. In the surfacing of a difference in the fixity of the transcendental, of the permanent, the static, the unchanging universal, of the blindly iterative, an active time-making emerges which endows activity with the subjectivity of the instantaneous made actual as a conscious awareness of time’s creation. The follow-focus of the mind on the work taps into a succession which is “the direct vision of the mind by the mind” and “bears above all upon internal duration” (Bergson, 1970, p. 32). In this respect, intuition in iterative processes is the beyond-memory of habit, of a non-reflexive automatism, wherein the possible departs from the tried and true as a result of the momentary distraction permitted by sheer boredom, or the chanciness of ludic variation, or the contempt of familiarity which all lead to discernible differences as offerings of choice as innovative possibility. Here, a differencial differentiation implies itself into the what something is from the what it is not, through the what it can be otherwise, or the what it could be—through the negative, through the possible and through its potential.

Any type of deviation from the routine, any error or mistake that accidentally takes place can be seen as a chance inventive happening, as a stumbling into creation, as a fortuitous production of creative ideas which are no different from ideas generated through more “serious” programmed or methodically systematic approaches. The method of intuition when worked through iterative processes is akin to an attentive attentment to the event’s immediation where focus is directly maintained on the sensory aspects of the interactive doing of the practice as opposed to the rationalisations around the what the work ought to or could be. Through the method of material intuition intrinsic to the iterative gesture, the artist can modulate the degree of turbulence that can be entrained into the habitually established as the regular, as the norm and the normalising in a process. The well-worn flow of production depleted of creativity and innovation serves as background to the revelation of any chance occurrence or anomalous variation in what is habitually established as creative possibility. It is this polished, smooth, featureless iteration, where perceptive and memory circuits become lifeless through the

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4 We are prone to use definite articles with words which do not usually warrant one (the now, the has-been, the what it is not, etc) to emphasise the differential as a discrete individualisation within the individuation of process as an affirmation of actual difference. Likewise, we use the term differential as a noun more frequently than as an adjective to emphasise the creative otherness of that which constitutes the difference produced in the advance whether it is a product-productive or state-transformative process.
atrophied, unwavering repeated methodical application of technics and techniques which allows the possibility of creativity to emerge. This ground-zero is not a nothingness, a vacuous void or blankness—it is the raison méthodée, a movement of thought become the doing reconciled as the way of doing, eventually rendered habitual by a mindless repetition of the same technics, techniques and use of materials. It is a ground-zero as background upon which any movement evokes the possibility of aesthetic (as sensorially creative and ‘artistically’ productive) novelty and opens a window to the practicability of experimentation. Given a practice and putting one’s mind to it, to research-create at this level is to allow the minutest discernment of difference to inflect a practice towards the possibility of creative deviation into novelty.

If one defines intuition as immediate, unmediated knowledge, that is not inferred through ratiocination, that is direct and seemingly uncaused, we can postulate two dimensions to intuition which need to be foregrounded: first, its temporal immediacy as an instantaneous consciousness of what is at play; second, the directness of the acquisition of knowledge as an unmediated advancement of creation in the present as a future, as pay-off to the way of doing, eventually reconciled as doing, as compliance to a predetermined protocol in the latter. Further, démarche in its secondary meaning, as ‘commencer à marcher’, as a starting to walk, also ties in to the classical depiction of the classical methods of the art of memory as a walked path, as a making way (Yates, 1966). So the insight of intuition is the direct vision of the mind by the mind in the perceptual cognition of its functioning as the incipiency of memory which through repetition becomes the memory of the way to doing something: a method.

What is philosophical in this way of becoming as a method? Deleuze is categorical in stating that “intuition is neither a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a

Intuition in Art Practice according to Bergson’s and Deleuze’s formulation

Bergson mainly presents his ideas on intuition in his books Creative Evolution (L’Évolution créatrice, 1907, trans. 1944) and A Study in Metaphysics: The Creative Mind (La Pensée et le mouvant, 1934, trans. 1970). For him, “intuition is the direct vision of the mind by the mind” (Bergson, 1970, p. 32). “Intuition, then, signifies first of all consciousness, but immediate consciousness, a vision which is scarcely distinguishable from the object seen, a knowledge which is in contact and even coincidence” (Bergson, 1970, p. 32). But the consciousness is not a consciousness as awareness of the instant, but of identifying the manifestation of the inflection in the automatic deviation of the stimulus into a response as consciousness—this is at the core of Bergson’s and Deleuze’s anti-phenomenalism as participative heterogeneity: not a conscience of something but an immanent becoming experiential. And in the grasping of the difference between ‘a this’ and ‘a that’, we discern the functioning of the démarche of intuition which is guided by an unknowable operative logic that inflects the reconciliation of the ideal and the material as the clinamen towards a specific actual doing: “from this centre of force, which is moreover inaccessible, there springs the impulse which gives the impetus, that is to say the intuition itself” (Bergson, 1970, p. 120). This distinction between the démarche of intuition and a systematic method is significant because in the former, we have a doing as a ‘manière d’agir à sa façon’—one’s own way of acting as subjectivity—versus a prescribed way of doing as compliance to a predetermined protocol in the latter. Further, démarche in its secondary meaning, as ‘commencer à marcher’, as a starting to walk, also ties in to the classical depiction of the classical methods of the art of memory as a walked path, as a making way (Yates, 1966). So the insight of intuition is the direct vision of the mind by the mind in the perceptual cognition of its functioning as the incipiency of memory which through repetition becomes the memory of the way to doing something: a method.

What is philosophical in this way of becoming as a method? Deleuze is categorical in stating that “intuition is neither a feeling, an inspiration, nor a disorderly sympathy, but a
fully developed method [...] constituting that which Bergson calls “precision” in philosophy" (Deleuze, 1991, p. 13). Thus, following the ideas of Bergson and Deleuze, the philosophical method of intuition consists in the advance of knowledge as a creative evolution. It is a mode of thought which is impelled by what came before towards a future which draws us towards it in terms of an inescapable progression actualised in the present—but not any present whatever, but in a ‘now’ that is inevitable yet often surprising. And this inevitability is decisive, free of doubt, certain, undeniable, completive yet open.

The method, in all its determinateness, is indeterminate—the cause of the movement is not determinable even if the outcome is inevitable and definite. The multiplicity which constitutes becoming is so complex and has so many degrees of freedom, that to establish a causality can be likened to a chancy probabilistic determination. It is interesting to note that the Greek πρόβληµα [problema]—literally, a thing thrown or put forward—encompasses the conceptual constellation of things that are cast, thrown out or put forward and includes dice, nets and fishing lines punctuated by lures. And perhaps the purest of problems, as Brazilian philosopher Peter Pal Pelbart posits, lies in casting one’s net where there are no fish in the multiplicity which Bergson calls “precision” in philosophy” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 13). Thus, following the ideas of Bergson and Deleuze, the philosophical method of intuition consists in the advance of knowledge as a creative evolution. It is a mode of thought that happens in a particular way. The moment of intuition is in the motive conditions of action as the making time of difference in the time of its making, in the feeling of the transition as inevitable outcome. Thus, the moment of intuition is the interval between the what comes before and the what comes after, the scansion of the movement’s direct realisation. And it is the surprising certitude and celerity of passage which produces the affective flash that leaves us breathless or leads us to the pronouncement of the interjection of discovery. Yes, the ‘Aha!’ moment—the joy of the artist who has realized his thought, the joy of the thinker who has made a discovery or invention (Bergson, 1920, p. 30).

In Bergsonism (1991), Deleuze reformulates the method of intuition as gleaned from Bergson. In the chapter entitled ‘Intuition as Method’, Deleuze lays out the method in terms of “three distinct sorts of acts that in turn determine the rules of the method” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 14). The way he does this is by a progressive application of discursive carving away or reduction of possibilities to determine what is ultimately operative as a guiding principle. Deleuze determines what is ultimately productive in intuition by following the same ‘intuitive’ method which Bergson himself uses to analyse what is essentially operative in the four theses which emerge from Berkeley’s thought on intuition: Deleuze, like Bergson before him, uses the method he is prescribing to do what he is prescribing as a self-referencing use of the method. The three rules of the method stipulated by Bergson consist of problematisation, differentiating, and temporalizing. This involves, one, a critique of false problems and the invention of genuine ones; two, narrowing and convergence; and three, thinking in terms of the multiplicity of duration. As such, we are served a panoply of possibilities in the encounter which must be whittled down into a pointed end which indicates and incites the unavoidable adequate contraction. Intuition represents the movement of the realisation of passage to the adequation of the contraction as the completion of the Bergsonian image. This is not a step-by-step protocol towards the correct use of intuition as method but an offering of strategies or possible approaches towards the posing of a precise and unambiguous problem through the almost formulation of its exacting and fitting solution. Deleuze quotes Bergson: “the stating and solving of the problem are here very close to being equivalent: the truly great problems are set forth only when they are solved” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 16).

One needs to distinguish between the process of intuition and its payoff. The intuition is not the outcome—it is the movement of thought that happens in a particular way. The moment of intuition is in the motive conditions of action as the making time of difference in the time of its making, in the feeling of the transition as inevitable outcome. Thus, the moment of intuition is the interval between the what comes before and the what comes after, the scansion of the movement’s direct realisation. And it is the surprising certitude and celerity of passage which produces the affective flash that leaves us breathless or leads us to the pronouncement of the interjection of discovery. Yes, the ‘Aha!’ moment—the joy of the artist who has realized his thought, the joy of the thinker who has made a discovery or invention (Bergson, 1920, p. 30).

In terms of the movement of thought, how does one (re)produce the immediacy of intuitive knowledge so that two minds can know one thing? How can the power of unmediated realisation be directly transferred to another or to others without loss? Here we discern a image or fold between the maker and the spectator or consumer as characteristic of the encounter as experiential of the artwork: on one side, we have the artist working assiduously on a statement as a formulation of a problem that finds its expression as a realization of what is at play in the work of art, and on the other, the

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2 We use the term feeling as defined by Whitehead in Process and Reality (1929, 1978) as “the basic generic operation of passing from the objectivity of the data to the subjectivity of the actual entity in question” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 40).
experiencing of the work of art as the embodied expression of the emergent singularity which is to be gotten from experiencing the work. It is the embodied entity which emerges from the midst of individuation as the materialisation of form and the information of matter. And by stating this, we do not intend to curtail the expressive possibilities of a work of art, but to invoke precision and exactness as necessary qualities in the problematisation of experience which translates into adequacy of expression in an artwork. The more succinctly the problem is stated in the artwork, the clearer the solution will be. This does not say that the posing of a clear and succinct problem is simplistic, as every problem is a multiplicity and its implications can be multiple and profound. And this does not mean that to attain the succinct expression of the problem is necessarily an easy feat nor does it mean an easily accessible solution! To arrive at the problem and its concomitant solution can be just as difficult for the artist as it can be for the viewer—both artists and viewers, makers and consumers, end up with the solutions they deserve to the problem they are able to pose in relation to the artwork. Further, the artist's solution to his own problem might represent an answer to a viewer's more insightful solution to his own problem might represent an answer to a viewer's more insightful solution to his own problem might represent an answer to a viewer's more insightful relation to the artwork. Further, the artist's solution to his own problem might represent an answer to a viewer's more insightful problematisation. Intuition is productive, not in a haphazard manner, but through an exacting decisiveness: intuition is unhesitating, resolute and determined in its taking action—it is a threshold moment in the advance into novelty that is not chancy in itself but absolutely necessary in its outcome. A creator may not be aware of the problem he was posing when he had the intuition, but that discovery that takes him by surprise, that brilliant insight that seems up years of work, that moment of revelation that informs the 'Aha!' or 'Yes!', is the obvious result of some appropriate positing of the problem but revealed \textit{ex post facto}, of establishing the exact configuration of compositional conditions that inevitably yield a specific result after the fact of its production. Intuition encompasses a variety of possible outcomes as expression of the inevitable conclusion derived from the way that the problematisation of the artwork is posited. The solution to the artwork's problematisation can be: a single, inevitable solution; a multiplicity of solutions; a non-solution as a paradox, enigma, or a confusing, improper formulation; or an open-ended iterative replication of its problematization. And depending on the intended pragmatic purpose of the artwork stated in terms of adequacy, whether explicitly acknowledged or not, the artwork in itself has a unique, singular, coherent expression which encompasses being wide-open to experience and to interpretation.

The method gets underway with the casting of a speculative positing of a preliminary position-question as a tentative problem seeking solutions. But not just any kind of problem, a proposition which expects a follow-through and finds it in terms of a true problem as movement into novelty. The question seeks to answer the simple question of 'what now?' as resolution of the moment of crisis. To know how to answer this question decisively, without prevarication, without doubt, to know the 'why' in the 'how' of the present is the exercise of subjective freedom as the expression of intuition. The "power to decide, to constitute problems themselves" (Deleuze, 1991, p. 15) is what constitutes true majority and it is this completive knowledge of the 'why' in the 'how' that Simondon (2001) postulates in the relation between humans and the world. We maintain that this is not a formulation of the problem by attempting to contain it, by rendering it determinable by categorically delimiting it from the outside, but of working with it to render the problem productive of a necessary, inevitable truth within and without—the truth is in the productivity of the operational coherence of the problem as a restatement of its premises, conditions, situation, implications, through to its possible outcomes and a decisive adequate solution. We find ourselves with the solution we deserve to the problem we have been able to pose, yet, if we do not like that solution we can always continue to cast until we land a solution we like better to a different aspect of the problem.

Seeing truth as productive of operative coherence is significant here because it sidesteps the moral problem of ascertaining veracity as opposed to ascertaining integrity as concreteness within the unfolding of actuality. It is a repositioning of the problem from the normative moral logic of a problem's being true or false to the ethical knowledge of how things
actually function coherently—of how the solution is territorialised functionally. And through its functioning we can discern whether what is being produced i.e. what is being considered as new, is distinctly innovative and inventive or simply a difference of intensity: are we wetting our foot in a ‘different stream’ or simply treading water in the same place; is the moment a circular (re)petition of the same or is it composing through a different multiplicity altogether and diverging from the tangent of the status quo? In carrying out this differentiation, we come to see whether in fact what we are advancing is a problem or a non-problem: are we composing innovation? Or are we occupied with busy-work? We cannot confuse the line of flight and the tangent—it is a question of coming to terms with the tension within the determination of what is at play, i.e. the resolution between intensities or intention into the how it will be done. If the tendency is acted upon, one is no longer within the parameters of the former operative potentials but activating a series of potentials opened up by digressing as a line of flight of the perpetual unfolding of the event into difference. And the difference is not constituted by the tangent which is often mistaken as the digression, but an advance into novelty.

The rediscovering of “the true differences in kind or articulations of the real” is Deleuze’s second rule of intuition as method and this is the foundation to its being considered “a method of division” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 21-2). If experience offers us “nothing but composites” (mixtes), we must unbraid the multiplicity of the whole into its articulations and tease out the meshing of qualitative and qualified tendencies. If we see the event as a concretised assemblage, division is here understood as a divergent parting out, as the analytical abstraction of eventual process. Thus, we can come to discern that which is in truth operative, that is productive of difference in kind according to the way in which the moment combines “duration and extensity as they are defined as movements, directions of movements (hence duration-contraction and matter-expansion [détente])” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 23).

The invisible progress of time as processual advancement will be recognised as affective tonality as a direct presentation of the qualitative change of time as temporality as opposed to measured time. The ‘answer’ of intuition becomes ‘time will tell’ and time becomes the transformational transition as the expression of subjectivity along a new line as experience. This constitutes the third rule of intuition as method: “State problems and solve them in terms of time rather than of space” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 31).

Bergson and Deleuze both take recourse in the calculus of difference and in the consideration of the a priori and the a posteriori within Kant’s philosophy of categories to demonstrate how the three rules of the method are not to be reconciled as a priori or a posteriori determinations as things in themselves but instead as differential progression of otherness as eventual becoming. Within the passage of time, the present follows the past and precedes the future. Each moment is conditioned by what has transpired and preconditions what will be: the present exists in a perpetual state of tension as a bergsonian co-existence of past-present-future where past and future always inhere in the present yet the three are individually separate and distinct. Yet, the continuity of the three tenses means that if these three temporal distinctions are continuous, then they must be the same “thing” for there are no disjointed parts in continuity. This paradoxical problem is reconciled in actuality, yet thought cannot integrate both aspects of time as continuous internal change of transition and the passage of one discrete moment to the next. Hence, the need as Deleuze points out in Difference and Repetition (Différence et Repetition, 1968, trans. 1994) for two kinds of difference: difference in kind and difference in itself. The continuous production of difference is the production of difference in itself as pure difference or what Deleuze calls differentiation; the discontinuous production of difference is the production of difference in kind from one moment to the next which Deleuze distinguishes as differenciation; both are required to express difference as the advance within process which is productive of time.

The moment of intuition in its infinitesimal smallness is the conjunction of circumstances which affords an opportunity of becoming as event. It is the auspicious moment in which the multiplicity conditions are ripe, charged, pregnant, oversaturated with the possibility of emergence, which, when given the chance, the odds are that it will produce movement. It is a turning-point, the cusp, the point of passage of the threshold, an inflection—but technically not a point of inflection—which deviates the relation
so that it diverges from the established path into the novelty of innovation; it is the veering away from the tangent—it is the point of take-off of the transversal line of flight. It is the differenteciation in the differentiation.

This deviation is a moment of truth in that it tests to the smallest detail the commitment of the advance into novelty. Intuition is thus a very small move compared to the overwhelming functional operativity of memory, it occurs at the level of the differential, at the limit condition where an infinitely small disruption produces an infinitely small provocation towards a differential difference. “It is indisputable that the basis of real, and so to speak instantaneous intuition, on which our perception of the external world is developed, is a small issue compared with all that memory adds to it” (Bergson, 1991, p. 66). From the afferent nerves into the centre of indetermination, through to the efferent nerves, affective modification wends its way through the neural pathways of a divergent modality of memory and subsequently as a convergent modality which jointly constitute the (re)call, the (re)collection and (re)membering of memory's participation within experience. “It is the recollections of memory that link the instants to each other and intercalate the past in the present. Finally, it is memory again in another form, in the form of a contraction of matter that makes the quality appear” (Deleuze, 1991, p. 25 translation modified). 9 In that gap between the ‘that’ which comes before, and the ‘what’ which comes after, there is a shift in the operation of memory which determines the outcome of the deviation. The first memory produces a progressive branching which becomes more ingrained whenever that experiential circuit is (re)called to inform the paths of choice. It also becomes less flexible every time it is (re)petitioned to offer its guidance in making the right choice and in taking the right direction towards a successful completion. The ramification is a gradual, progressive complexification where (re)petition promotes a finer and more intricately detailed penetration as resolutive analysis—an ever-finer horizontic fringing. The role of the second memory is to produce the convergence amidst the divergence; it is the drawing together of the disparate paths, the contraction into a concurrence which (re)members divergent pathways to a specific outcome as a choice of action. This second movement of memory is a simplification where the complexified past as a multiplicity is bundled together, (re)collected, into a singular, coherent expression. The switch-over from one memory to the next is a threshold moment which both expresses a passage through and the overcoming of the resistance to passage into difference, of the leap of faith across the gap to pursue the path laid out before it as operative resolution. What is required of the problem is to invoke a convergence, to induce the contraction, of taking what is implied and not plainly expressed, bringing it to a head and expressing it unequivocally, decisively, leaving nothing open to suggestion. It is a rendering of the ambiguous precise by the removal of the representational and expliciting the transformation directly without intermediary.

The realization of the ‘Aha!’ moment is the corollary of the realization of the ‘Oh, No!’ moment. The ‘Oh, No!’ moment is the moment when one realizes that the result is not the positive, affirmative advance into novelty one was looking for, but the negative, detractive digression into failure one was likely trying to avoid. But if one looks closely, the ‘Aha!’ moment and the ‘Oh, No!’ moment share the same movement. They simply show different aspects of ego involvement in the work. However, of the two, the ‘Oh, No!’ moment is usually the one that leads to a retrospective examination of the precursory conditions, to a reconfiguration of the compositional elements, to a different repositioning of the questions, in order to reformulate the problem. The ‘Aha!’ and the ‘Oh, No!’ moments share the unexpected, being more or less close to the hazards of creation.

For an artist to attain this clarity of expression and achieve the free-flowing, untrammelled directness and immediacy of movement towards the repetition of the intuition of the ‘Aha! moment’, the 99% perspiration of creative effort is required to hone and polish the statement so that it unalteringly produces the surprising and inevitable response in the viewer. This art-work entails the manifold repeated repositioning, realignment, reconfiguration of the conditions and circumstances, of compositional elements

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9 “Ensuite, ce sont les souvenirs de la mémoire, qui relient les instants les uns aux autres et intercalent le passé dans le présent. Enfin, c’est encore la mémoire sous une autre forme, sous forme d’une contraction de la matière qui fait surgir la qualité” (Le Bergsonisme, 1966, p. 16). The English text translates intercaler as interpolate and thus introduces a spurious or fictive element to the expansion where there ought not be one.
for them to continually produce different and partial solutions that will eventually take us to the totalising experience of the intuitive synthesis. It is this crafting of the artistic conception into an artwork that demands effort: “It experiences our force, keeps the imprint of it, calls for its intensification” (Bergson, 1920, p. 29). The fact that there is procession, advance, movement that generates difference is indicative of method—its drive is to advance conditions which complexify the production of solutions. Complexification is not a rendering of the problem more complicated but of unraveling the knotty reciprocal implication of ideas and matter through the progressive refinement of the statement of the problem by the advancement of partial solutions.

Often, it is the retrospective examination of the conditioning of the problematic which allows the (re)formulation of the circumstances for the coming to being of a solution, or the movement of intuition, in order to allow the direct transmission of the artist’s statement vehicled by the artwork. The analysis of the conditions and circumstances as a problematization of artistic research constitutes the grounds for being able to replicate that experience, to recompose the event in order for it to be productive of its repetition. In terms of an intuitive dynamic, the experiential in a work of art is a lived act, which is the irreversible conversion of process into specific advancement as difference in kind produced by, with and through the work of art, both in terms of practice (technē) and as objective artwork. The aesthetic interaction with an artwork is not a question of guiding the viewer to a preconceived conclusion but of creating problematizing conditions as an ecology of relations with the artwork, of producing the compositional circumstances between artwork and viewer which will be productive of the appropriate problematization in the viewer and lead to the adequate response—appropriate in that it will yield the fitting response to the question or problem the artist is posing. In this respect, to assure the transmission of a specific movement of thought, the propitious conditions need to be in place that will precisely and exactly reproduce the circumstances for experientially arriving at the appropriate conclusion as a direct, unmediated and immediate intuition. The artwork thus lays out the territory as conditioning milieu so the viewer can trace their way along the same path of intuition. Intuition as method leads the way to reach the same destination. Whether or not they do make it to the same determinate realisation depends on the precision and exactness in which the original experience posited by the work of art is recognizable in its repetition in the experiencing of the artwork. What the artist struggles to get across as intuition, that which is to be gotten from the artwork, is a primitive realisation from which a world can be built. It is not content, message, or missive. It is a seed crystal of time which unites “an actual image and a virtual image to the point where they can no longer be distinguished” (Deleuze, 1989, p. 335).

**Conclusion**

Intuition, as distinctly operative, is durational. It is imbued with movement and change—it is the method of Bergsonism. But, as method, it is the way that experience is integrated into the advance of being as differential becoming. Intuition is what brings about the deflection, the divergence, the deviation, the digression which constitutes the marked difference as the durational in temporality, as differentiated moments, as difference in kind and not a difference in degree. Individuation, as processual advance, is an unceasing subjective production of the ‘now’ as coextensive of past, present, future and actual which is always different, deviant, and always other. At every moment in the continuity of becoming of a processual advance, the availability and offering of potential is different: the ‘now’ of the present is not a placeholder in time but the passing as process to the what’s coming ‘next’ as the choice become actual between potential available to potential realised or potential relinquished. And that hidden, indeterminate quality guiding the attentiveness within the passing of potential from activation, actualisation and relinquishment of potential is the activity of intuition.

Intuition is indicative that what is taking place is within the realm of duration as ‘now’, as the creation of time: to last is to continue the production of time. The continuity as perduration emerges in time’s creation as lasting, unexhausted, vital duration. Duration pays off as the dividends of division as differenciation, as the built-in gift of the giving of difference. Intuition is implicit in ‘the now’ as the immediacy of transition as time-making and where ‘the not-now’ is extensive and spatial. Transcendence looks to arrest time to establish
‘the now’ as locative, as ‘a here’, as representational. ‘The now’, as the modality of time’s creation, as the moment of change, of transformative transition, as the present of the giving of difference, as the moment of inflection in becoming, is always a creative more-than, a surplus value, because it is different in kind from whatever came before as an add-on to processual advance. As Deleuze affirms, intuition presupposes duration, but without intuition as the decisiveness subending the change-over—the making of temporality would only be a psychological experience. It is through intuition that creative innovation as difference in kind as change can become known as the advance of time.

Bibliography


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